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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD L. STEADMAN and
DONNA B. STEADMAN,
his wife, and
NORMA E. STEADMAN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
LAKE HILLS, a corporation, and
M. M. MERRILL, and LESTER M.
JOHNSON and JOHNSON
ENTERPRISES, INC.,
successors in interest
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No.

10779

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Because Respondents' brief is replete with misstatements of fact and citations of authorities in
support of propositions of law which they in fact
do not support, appellants deem it necessary to file
this reply to the assertions made by Respondents.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants reaffirm their statement of facts in
their original brief and make the following clarifications of assertions made in Respondents' statement
of facts:
On page 2 of Respondents' brief it is asserted
that the note was "directly incorporated into the
mortgage" and that "the mortgage provided that
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'in case of default in payment of this note, we agl'ee
to pay all costs of collection, including a i·easonable
attorney's fee' ". The truth is that the mortgage
merely recited the terms of the note without making
them a part of the terms agreed to in the mortgage
and therefore the provision of the note referring to
attorney's fees is not one of the mortgage obligations.
(R.5).
On page 3 of Respondents' brief it is stated that
appellants had failed to pay taxes on the property
for the years 1955 through 1961 and the property had
been the subject of a tax sale. The truth is that the
taxes for 1955 through 1957 had been abated by
Salt Lake County (R. 70), the taxes for 1958 through
1960 were the subject of abatement proceedings in
process when Respondents' suit was commenced (R.
17-18), and were eventually paid under protest,
( R. 70), the taxes for 1961 were not yet due, and
the record does not indicate that the property had
been subject to a tax sale.
On page 4 of Respondents' brief it is stated that
"by virtue of the foreclosure, the Respondents were
effectively protected, their mortgage interest was
rendered more secure." The truth is that there was
no foreclosure and Respondents needed no protection
since there was no default and all installments were
paid to and received by Respondents (R. 71-72).
Also on page 4 of Respondents' brief it is stated
that Respondents' amended and supplemental complaint alleged that Lake Hills' successor-in-interest
had agreed to pay Respondents' attorney's fees. The
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truth is that no such allegation appears in the
amended and supplemental complaint ( R. 50-51),
and no such agreement was ever made by the successor-in-interest.
On pages 4 and 5 of Respondents' brief it is
asserted that it was uncontroverted that Respondents' counsel had spent 192 hours on the prosecution
of the foreclosure action. The truth is that part
of those 192 hours was spent after trial in numerous
other matters and in researching and briefing issues
not involved in this case (R. 109, 114-15).
On page 5 of Respondents' brief it is stated that
the Order Nunc Pro Tune was entered pursuant to
a conversation had with counsel for both parties.
The fact is that this statement is not supported by
the record and the record indicates that the motion
for the order was made ex parte without notice (R.
82).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO ATTORNEY'S FEES DEPENDS BOTH ON THE TERMS
OF THE MORTGAGE AGREEMENT AND ON
THE OUTCOME OF THE LITIGATION.
There is no disagreement between Appellants
and Respondents that attorney's fees are not allowable on a mortgage foreclosure unless specifically
provided in the mortgage agreement. However, it is
surprising to Appellants that Respondents would

•
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claim that the right to attorney's fees does not depend on the outcome of the litigation. In this case
the mortgage agreement makes the attorney's fees
depend on the outcome by using the words "in the
event of foreclosure." Moreover, even if the mortgage
provided for attorney's fees upon the institution of
an action, it is inconceivable that a court would
award attorney's fees just because an action had
been instituted. Surely a mortgagee is not entitled to
attorney's fees for filing an action that he is not
justified in filing. If he were so entitled, he could incur attorney's fees and charge them to his mortgagor
merely by filing a complaint when no delinquency
exists! The right to foreclose the mortgage, as determined by the outcome of the litigation, quite obviously has significant bearing on the right to attorney's
fees.
The right to foreclose the mortgage was decided
against Respondents' by the lower court's 1961 ruling of "no cause for action." However, the points
disputing this raised by Respondents' brief will be
dealt with in the order raised therein.
(a) Appellants were not in default under the

terms of the mortgage agreement nor would this be
grounds for awarding attorney's fees.
As pointed out on pages 8-9 and 10 of Appellants' brief there was no default since the 1961 installment was paid within the thirty-day grace
period provided in the escrow agreement and failure
to pay taxes was not grounds for foreclosure under
the terms of the mortgage.
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Respondents' claim that the escrow agreement
was subsequent to the mortgage and that they were
completely separate and independent agreements
each having no effect on the other is not supported
by the facts nor the law. Their own Amended and
Supplemental Complaint ( R. 50) alleges that the
escrow agreement was entered "at the time of the
execution and delivery of the mortgage" and that the
mortgage was executed and delivered "by the terms"
of the escrow agreement. Such a situation requires
that all the documents be read together to determine
the intent of the parties. Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16
Utah 2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 ( 1965) ; Strike v. Floor,
97 Utah 265, 92 P.2d 867 (1939); 17 AM JUR.
2d Con tracts § 264 ( 1964). Moreover, the practice
of paying and receiving all installments through the
escrow agent both before and after the action was
commenced indicates an intent to be bound by the
terms of the escrow agreement. Cheney v. Rucker, 14
Utah 2d 205, 381P.2d86, 91 (1963); Hardinge Co.
v. Eimco Corp., 1Utah2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954);
17 AM JuR. 2d Contracts § 274 (1964). Furthermore, any right to receive the annual installments by
April 15, the due date provided in the mortgage, was
waived by Respondents' acceptance of every installment prior to 1961 after April 15(R. 24). McBride
v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12, 249 Pac. 114, 116 ( 1926).
Even without such a waiver, payment after April 15
is not grounds for forfeiture in the absence of a
clause making time of the essence. Brixen v. Jorgensen, 28 Utah 290, 78 Pac. 674 (1904); Bisno v. Sax,
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175 Cal. App. 714, 346 P.2d 814 ( 1960). There is
no such clause in the mortgage here involved.
On page 8 of Respondents' brief two cases are
cited as holding that "subsequent documents affect
the terms of a prior mortgage agreement only where
they clearly purport so to do, or are incorporated
therein by reference." The first case cited, Knight v.
Kitchen, 237 App. Div. 506, 261 N.Y. Supp. 809
( 1933), in fact holds that a subsequent mortgage
changed the terms of a prior agreement without
purporting to do so or incorporating or referring
to the prior agreement. The other case, Patterson v.
Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 (1875), holds that a prior
agreement cannot vary the express terms of a later
mortgage. These authorities cited by Respondents
support Appellants' position and would make the
terms of the escrow agreement superior to any contradictory terms in the mortgage.
Respondents have attempted to make the terms
of the note part of the obligations under the mortgage. Three comments on this attempt appear necessary. First, as already explained there was no
default in the payment of the note that would activate the provision for attorney's fees. Second, if there
was a default, no further action was required after
the 1961 installment was paid on May 12, 1961 and
attorney's fees would be minimal. Third, the terms
of the note were merely referred to in the mortgage
as the object of the mortgage security. They were not
agreed to as part of the obligations of the mortgage.
The result of this distinction is that any attorney's
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fees that might be due under the terms of the note
alone are not a lien against the real property involved
and must be collected, if at all, from the signers of
the note. Appellants Johnson, as subsequent holders
of the property, are bound only by the obligations
of the mortgage and not by those of the note.
case.

(b) There has been no "foreclosure" in th'is

It is agreed that the terms of the mortgage itself
must govern the right to attorney's fees. Provisions
granting a right to attorney's fees are to be strictly
construed. Kinney v. Columbia Savings & Loan
Ass'n, 113 Fed. 359 (D. Utah 1902). There is no
right to attorney's fees under the mortgage here involved except "in the event of foreclosure." As
pointed out on pages 11-12 of Appellants' brief there
was no foreclosure since there was no termination of
the mortgagor's rights by decree, sale, or in any
other manner. Respondents have sought to prove a
foreclosure by citation of various authorities that
should be examined more closely then Respondents
have done.

On page 10 of Respondents' brief the case of
Insurance Co. of North America v. Cheathem, 299
S.W. 545 (Ky. 1927), is misquoted as stating that
foreclosure means the institution of suit to enforce
a lien against property. This was not the holding
of the court. The action was on a fire insurance
policy which contained a clause voiding the policy if
"foreclosure proceedings be commenced". The court
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held the policy void because proceedings had been
commenced though not completed.
In support of Respondents' proposition that the
"right to attorney's fees accrues at the commencement of the foreclosure action and not at the end
thereof" they have cited on pages 10-11 of their brief
the following authorities: Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y of the United States v. Boothe, 160 Ore. 679,
86 P.2d 960 (1939); Wienke v. Smith, 179 Cal. 220,
176 Pac. 42 (1918); In re Peerless Weaving &
Throwing Co., 259 Fed. 610 (M.D. Pa. 1919); Watson v. Sawyer, 12 Wash. 35, 40 Pac. 413 (1895);
Matter of Ebert, 140 F. Supp. 597 (D. Del. 1956);
59 C.J.S. Mortgages§ 812b (1949); 1 JONES, MORTGAGES§ 442, at 567-68 (8th ed. 1928). Examination
of each of these authorities reveals that every one of
them involves a mortgage providing for attorney's
fees in case of "default" or if "suit is brought". None
of them, therefore, supports Respondents' position.
Instead they all require strict adherence to the
express terms of the mortgage.
Then, on page 11 of Respondents' brief, another
attempt is made to convince the court that foreclosure is just the commencement of a proceeding by
the age-old ruse of quoting out of context. So that no
further question concerning this may be raised, the
entire passage is set-out from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages
§ 482, at761-62 (1949):
The term "foreclosure" has been used
with somewhat varying significance in and
concerning statutes, as well as in common
speech. In its natural and common usage, in
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the law of mortgages, it means a termination
of all rights of the mortgagor or of his grantee
in the property covered by the mortgage ; the
cutting off or depriving of the mortgagor of
the right of redeeming the mortgaged estate,
and is a remedy by which the property covered
by the mortgage may be subjected to sale for
the payment of the demand for which the
mortgage stands as security. It denotes, not
the beginning, but the end, of a procedure
adopted by the mortgagee to bar perpetually
the rights of the mortgagor, and includes the
sale itself of the mortgaged property, rather
than the steps preliminary to the sale. In its
essential meaning, it imports definiteness in
point of time as well as finality of consequence.
. . . . the term "foreclosure" has itself
acquired a modern significance, and it is now
applied to any proceeding by which the mortgagor's equity of redemption in the property
is cut off beyond possibility of recall. A procedure which results in the mortgagee eventually acquiring the mortgaged property clear
of all claims of the mortgagor is a foreclosure.
So, also, a proceeding terminating in a judicial
sale of the mortgaged premises by which the
mortgagor's rights are extinguished is a foreclosure, as is a valid exercise of a power of
sale conferred by the mortgage. In a nontechnical sense the term "foreclosure" may be applied to the enforcement of a mortgage by any
form of legal proceeding.
The terms of the mortgage require "the event of
foreclosure" to occur before attorney's fees are due.
Under the law there has been no foreclosure and
under the facts there was no right to commence an
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action. The lower court's award of attorney's fees
to Respondents was therefore error.
POINT IL
THE ISSUES OF LACHES, ESTOPPEL AND
HEARING BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE WERE
ALL RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT. THE
NUNC PRO TUNG ORDER COULD NOT AND
NEED NOT BE OBJECTED TO BEFORE APPEAL IS TAKEN THEREON.
The record is clear that the issues of laches,
estoppel and hearing by a different judge were all
raised in the lower court. Reference to Appellants'
Amendment to Reply ( R. 64-65) and Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact and for a New Trial, paragraphs 1 (b), 1 ( c), 4 and 5 ( R. 79-81), reveals this
to be the case. The lower court either overruled or
refused to consider these points and they are therefore properly raised on appeal.
The nunc pro tune order was obtained by Respondents on ex parte motion and after trial. In
fact it was obtained after the lower court had heard
and denied Appellants' Motion to Amend Findings
of Fact and for a New Trial. It was therefore too
late to raise any objection to the order in the lower
court. Moreover, it could only have been objected to
by something in the nature of a motion to set the
order aside or to amend the judgment which is not
prerequisite to an appeal and would have been a
useless gesture.
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The cases cited by Respondents on page 12 of
their brief relate to issues that were not considered
or presented to the lower court. Each of the issues
here was presented to the lower court.
Respondents have asserted on page 12 of their
brief that the issues of hearing before a different
judge and that the judgment is not supported by
findings of fact and conclusions of law were waived
by Appellants for failure to designate them as points
on appeal thereby prejudicing Respondents. This assertion is without foundation or substance. Point
three of Appellants Points Urged for Reversal (R.
87) explicitely raises the first issue. Furthermore,
there is no authority to indicate that failure to designate points on appeal is a waiver of them. Rule
75 ( d)' UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, requires
designation of points only when the whole record is
not designated. The purpose of this is to allow the
parties to designate the proper portions of the record.
The only portions of the record necessary to determine whether the judgment is supported by findings
and conclusions are the judgment and the findings
and conclusions. Since both of these items are in the
record on appeal ( R. 75-78) , there is no possible
prejudice to Respondents and the issue may properly
be considered by the court.
POINT III.
BY THEIR DELAY IN ASSERTING A
CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES RESPONDENTS HAVE FORFEITED THAT CLAIM UNDER THE LAW OF WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND
LA CHES.
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In Point III of their brief Respondents have apparently misunderstood Point II of Appellants' brief.
Respondents misrepresent Appellants' position as
the mere acceptance of past-due installments after
commencement of the action is waiver of the right to
attorney's fees. After citing cases to counter this
position Respondents then state that "it can scarcely be said that an acceptance of installments after
trial constitutes any more reason for finding a waiver than acceptance of installments before trial."
Appellants' actual position is that the acceptance of future installments (not just past-due installments) for a period of four-and-one-half years
without making a claim or demand for attorney's
fees or giving a notice of any kind that attorney's
fees were owing establishes waiver of any right to
those attorney's fees. In addition the change of position by Appellants Johnson in reliance on the facts
presented to them establishes estoppel and laches.
This position is fully explained and supported in
Appellants' brief.
Appellants are not relying only upon the acceptance of a past-due installment (which in fact was
not past-due but had been paid before delinquency
to the escrow agent from whom disbursal was refused by Respondents until after the 1961 trial).
Moreover, the cases cited on pages 13-14 of Respondents' brief do not support their position.
Uedelhofen v. Mason, 20 Ill. 465, 66 N.E. 364
( 1903), held that attorney's fees were still due under
a deed of trust foreclosed as a mortgage when a
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tender of the whole amount due except attorney's
fees was made after the decree was entered, not before the decree as implied by Respondents.
Harris v. Whittier Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 18 Cal.
App. 2d 260, 63 P.2d 840 ( 1936), says nothing about
attorney's fees and holds that the acceptance of part
of the past-due amounts under a deed of trust is
not a waiver of the right to declare default as to
the remaining past-due amounts.
Bisno v. Sax, 175 Cal. App. 2d 712, 346 P.2d
814 (1960), also says nothing about attorney's fees
as claimed by Respondents and in fact holds that
the payment of past-due installments after institution of foreclosure proceedings cures the default and
reinstates the deed of trust even though accleration of payments had been declared.
Sellman v. Crosby, 20 Cal. App. 2d 562, 67 P.2d
706 (1937), like the Harris case declares that the acceptance or tender of part of the past-due amounts
is not a waiver of the rights under the acceleration
clause as to the remaining past-due amounts. The
court then implies that it would consider it a waiver
if all past-due installments had been paid and accepted, which would conform to its later holding
in Bisno v. Sax, above.
All of these cases refer to past-due installments,
not future installments, and none of them supports
Respondents' position. If anything, they support
the position of Appellants.
Appellants quite agree with Respondents' assertion on page 15 of their brief that no question of
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entitlement to attorney's fees arose until 1966. Any
supposed right to attorney's fees accrued during the
proceedings in 1961. The failure of Respondents to
assert that right then and during the next four-andone-half years, during which the Appellants Johnson
entered the picture, precludes them from asserting
it now. Waiver, estoppel and laches are clearly established.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL DECISION OF "NO CAUSE FOR ACTION" WAS A
JUDGMENT RENDERING THE ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES RES JUDI CAT A.
Appellants admit that under the decisions of
this court a minute entry is ordinarily not a final
judgment. However, the cases cited by Respondents
on pages 15-16 of their brief are easily distinguished
from the instant case. This is not a situation where
the Appellants merely neglected to have a written
judgment signed and entered before an appeal was
taken. Rather, several attempts were made to have
findings of facts and conclusions of law signed by
the trial judge so that a final judgment could be
entered. But because the trial judge failed to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required
by Rule 52 (a), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
and placed on Appellants the burden of getting Respondents to agree to findings and conclusions, no
written judgment was signed and entered. And because Appellants and all others who might be interested were allowed by Respondents to rely on the

I .
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minute entry of "no cause for action" for four-andone-half years, the Appellants should not be deprived
of their right to an effective and final judgment
after a trial on the disputed issues. In such a case
equity demands that the decision of "no cause for
action" be res judicata.
It is significant that Respondents did not attempt to have the lower court overturn the ruling
of "no cause for action" and proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage. They have in fact acquiesced
in that ruling and then obtained an award of attorney's fees which conflicts with and was disposed of
by that ruling.To say, as Respondents have, that the
ruling of "no cause for action" left the issue of attorney's fees unresolved is to say once again that a
mortgagee may penalize his mortgagor with attorney's fees even though the mortgagor has complied
with all terms of the mortgage. The issue was not
mentioned in the minute entry because there was
no evidence on the issue at the trial and because attorney's fees are not allowable unless a cause of
action exists.

Once again it is necessary to correct Respondents' statement of the law. On page 16 of their brief
it is stated that "res judicata applies only to those
issues, both legal and factual, which have been clearly disposed of on the face of the judgment." The Utah
case cited for this proposition, Hartford Acc. &
Idem. Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919
( 1943), holds only that res judicata does not apply
in the absence of a final judgment. The other case
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cited, Stark v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390,
392-93 (1942), actually had the following to say:
While it is true that as a general rule a
judgment is a bar as res judicata not only as
to a subsequent action on the same matter
actually determined but also as to all issues
that might have been litigated as incident to
or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming
within its legitimate purview .... it is also
true that that only is adjudged in a former
judgment which appears upon its face to have
been adjudged or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto ... And when it affirmatively appears that
an issue was not determined by the judgment,
it obviously is not res judicata upon that issue.
In that case the first judgment had expressly
reserved the right of the plaintiff to determine his
rights in a subsequent action. The court stated that
this reservation was an improper splitting of causes
of action but was nevertheless final and binding on
the parties because the judgment had not been appealed.
To apply that case to the facts of the case now
before this court, if the lower court had actually
reserved the issue of attorney's fees for later determination, it would have been error from which an
appeal could be taken. The failure to expressly reserve the issue means that it was conclusively determined in the proceeding resulting in a judgment of
"no cause for action".
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Respondents' misplaced reliance on the cases
cited in their brief aside, the law of res judicata in
the State of Utah is as follows: A judgment rendered
in a former action between the same parties or their
privies, on the same cause of action, operates as a
bar not only as to every matter raised and determined in the former action, but also as to every
other matter which might have been raised or determined in that action. When the cause of action in the
latter action is different, the former judgment bars
only those matters actually raised and determined.
National Fin. Co. v. Daley, 14 Utah 2d 263, 382
P.2d 405 (1963); Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d
45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962); East Mill Creek Water Co.
v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863, 866
(1945); Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86
Utah 340, 16 P.2d 1097 (1932) adhered to on rehearing, 86 Utah 354, 44 P.2d 698 (1935). This law
clearly makes the original judgment rendered in the
instant case res judicata as to the matter of attorney's fees.
Respondents' reliance on Rule 54 (b), UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, is also misplaced. Again
quoting out of context Respondents omitted the first
portion of the rule which provides that it applied
only "when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action." Even if it could be said that
there was more than one claim for relief presented
in this action, the demand for attoney's fees was not
one of them. Moreover, the judgment of "no cause
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for action" adjudicated all claims in the action and
therefore Rule 54 (b) does not apply.
The allegation of Respondents that the original
trial judge was confronted by counsel for both parties and entered the order nunc pro tune with the
consent of both parties is not supported by the record. The order itself shows that it was obtained
ex parte. ( R. 82) Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that the original trial judge would even remember the case let alone whether or not he meant to
reserve the issue of attorney's fees five years earlier.
POINT V.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE
LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT.
Respondents' attempt to reconstruct their "Petition for Allowance of Attorney's Fees" into a "motion" so as to bring it within the terms of Rule 52 (a)
making findings and conclusions unnecessary on
motions needs little comment.
The purpose of Rule 52 (a), which is also misquoted by Respondents, is quite obviously to require
the court to make findings of fact whenever factual
issues are involved - whenever evidence, and in
particular, oral testimony, is presented to the court
as proof of facts - and to make findings unnecessary when a decision or judgment is rendered in
response to a motion on issues of law when no facts
are involved or in dispute. To say that findings were
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not necessary in this case when Respondents found
it necessary to present evidence to the court in the
form of oral testimony, upon which the court was
to base its decision, is to say that Rule ( 52 (a) is
meaningless and that findings of fact are never
necessary. Under Respondents' reasoning every trial
could be brought before the court by a "petition" or
"motion" for judgment and because it is brought up
by a "motion", no findings of fact need be made
from the evidence presented at the trial.
Any judgment or order allowing attorney's fees
to Respondents in this case necessarily depends upon
the facts involved. Unless that judgment is supported
by findings of fact and conclusions of law, it must
be reversed. This contention is supported by the cases
cited on page 27 of Appellants' brief which Respondents have attempted to distinguish by claiming that
they "either involve a 'judgment' based upon all of
the pleadings and not merely upon a motion of one
of the parties or are antedated by the Rules of Procedure." This attempt needs three comments. First,
the distinction between a judgment on all the pleadings and a motion is not a viable one, as already explained. Second, the decision in F.M.A. Financial
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670
( 1965), was with respect to the issue of attorney's
fees alone and not on all of the pleadings. Third, Respondents undoubtedly meant "postdated" rather
than "antedated" but similar provisions are nevertheless found in the prior code and three of the four
cases cited by Appellants were decided subsequent
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to the effective date of the UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.
POINT VI.
THE AT T 0 RN E Y ' S FEE OF $3500.00
AWARDED IN THIS CASE IS UNREASONABLE
AND UNCONSCIONABLE.
Respondents have asserted on page 21 of their
brief that the amount in controversy in this case
was in excess of $90,000.00. Their complaint alleged the amount due to be only $79,927.55. Moreover, there is no finding or conclusion anywhere in
these proceedings that any amount was due and no
judgment or decree was ever entered that any
amount was due. As a matter of fact all payments
on the note and mortgage were made to Respondents
so no judgment or decree could have been entered as
to the amount upon which attorney's fees should be
based.
As pointed out on page 10 of Appellants' brief
the lower court awarded attorney's fees to Respondents solely because it thought the mortgage could
be foreclosed for failure to pay taxes of $2,167.99.
This, then, is the only amount upon which the award
of attorney's fees could be based. To award attorney's
fees which amount to more than 160 percent of the
sum in controversy is unreasonable and unconscionable. The fee recommended by the UT AH STATE BAR
ADVISORY HANDBOOK ON OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND
FEES, at 22 (1961) is $4 74.80 and therefore
$3500.00 is unreasonable.
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Respondents have cited cases on page 22 of their
brief to show that attorney's fees from ten per cent
to seventy per cent of the amount in question have
been allowed as reasonable. It should be pointed out
that Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply,
17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141 ( 1965), held that an
attorney's fee of less than ten per cent of the amount
of the judgment was not unreasonable; Jens en v.
Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 Pac. 1036 (1915),
held that it was error to award an attorney's fee of
less than ten per cent of the amount of the judgment
without a determination that it was a reasonable fee;
Parkinson v. Amundson, 122 Utah 443, 250 P.2d 944
(1952), upheld an attorney's fee of $250.00 on a
judgment of $359.00 - indicating only that a higher
percentage fee may be allowed on small judgments.
None of these cases supports an attorney's fee
amounting to 160 per cent of the amount in question
and all of them are based on the amount of the judgment entered in the case. In the case now before the
court there is no judgment or decree either to justify
or upon which to base an attorney's fee.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and in Appellants'
initial brief, Respondents are not entitled to an
award of attorney's fees and Appellants respectfully
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pray that this court grant the relief requested in
Appellants' initial brief.
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